# Shells

### 1NC – Economic Engagement - Celik

#### 1. Interpretation - “Economic engagement” is limited to expanding economic ties.

Çelik 11 – Arda Can Çelik, Master’s Degree in Politics and International Studies from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11

Introduction Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "*It is a policy of* deliberate expanding economic ties *with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations* ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " *the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction*.

#### 2. Violation – Economic and Commercial engagement are different – the plan is commercial.

Vickers 12 – Dr. Brendan Vickers, Research Associate on Global Economy and Development at the Institute for Global Dialogue, South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 1, Ed. Landsberg and Van Wyk, p. 112-113

Conceptually, it is also possible to distinguish between 'economic' and 'commercial' diplomacy or, in another sense, the 'high' and 'low' politics of a country's international economic relations. In this chapter, economic diplomacy refers to the ways and means by which the South African government formally negotiates South Africa's place in the world economy at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Economic diplomacy has clear political economy objectives such as increasing the country's relative power or influence in international bargains: improving the country's (or an industry's) competitive advantage relative to others; and using political tools to achieve economic ends, and vice versa. Economic diplomacy thus encapsulates global policy-making processes, for example, in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UIMCTAD). the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (W1PO); as well as regional economic policymaking In the African Union <AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).a

South Africa's economic diplomacy agenda comprises four core policy imperatives: to expand trade and Investment links in Africa and advance regional integration in Southern and Eastern Africa: to consolidate links with traditional trade and investment partners in the North: to build industrial complementarities with the dynamic emerging economies of the South; and to rebalance global trade rules in favour of developing countries through the VVTO's Doha Round negotiations/' By contrast, commercial diplomacy entails a narrower set of activities that include export development and export promotion, facilitating inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI), promoting technology sharing and cooperation, positioning South Africa as a preferred tourism destination, and marketing South Africa more widely abroad. The objective of commercial diplomacy is to support South African business to gain tangibly from the opportunities created by broader economic diplomacy processes.1

### 1NC – Economic Engagement – Sole Purpose

#### 1. Interpretation – “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action – it cannot encompass broader forms of engagement

Jakstaite, 10 - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES” BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/v10076-010-0015-7)

The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

### 2AC POEs Aff – Economic Engagement

#### 1. We Meet - Border infrastructure improvements are economic engagement – they should be considered alongside trade, aid, and development policies

Gephardt 2002,   
Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo) was the House Democratic Leader. CENTER FOR Latin AmericanStudies UC Berkeley “Progressive Economic Engagement with Mexico and the World” Winter http://clas.berkeley.edu/Publications/Review/pdf/newswinter02.pdf

Everybody agrees that as we enter the 21st century, the global economy requires the United States to seek greater export opportunities. In addition, I believe that a new trade consensus must be rooted in our values. Not only is enhanced trade vital to U.S. economic growth and security, but it can also promote values fundamental to our democratic future: worker rights, environmental protection, and human rights. Working to open global markets and doing more to enhance global living standards will expand U.S., Mexican and global prosperity in the 21st century. Some have called the progressive approach to trade “protectionist.” That is an erroneous label. In fact, progressives are for expanded trade and for the United States meeting its leadership obligations in the international economic arena. However, we believe a broader approach is needed based on three pillars of economic policy: free and fair trade, enhanced development assistance, and debt relief for the poorest nations. Such a program could create more markets for U.S. exports, strengthen the middle class at home and abroad, and maximize our national security through a comprehensive program of engagement in all parts of the world. We need to forge a progressive approach to trade and development and create a new consensus on global economic engagement. At home in North America, we need to do more to promote trade and development with Mexico. NAFTA has been a real success in increasing trade between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, but it has done little to generate real development in Mexico. Despite the increases in trade, and enhanced Mexican productivity since 1993, a broad Mexican middle class has failed to emerge. Today Mexico is facing a serious recession and maquiladora jobs are leaving as companies move to nations, such as China, where wage rates are lower. Mexico is facing a race to the bottom and America needs to do more to combat this trend. We need to assist the government of President Vicente Fox with enhanced trade, aid and development. America has a great opportunity in the bilateral meetings at the Monterrey summit in March 2002 to work with Mexico on a progressive development plan. As a first step the resources of the North American Development Bank must be freed up to provide hundreds of millions of dollars of new environmental infrastructure along the border. Housing, health, and transportation infrastructure must also be improved at the border.

#### 2. Counter- interpretation – Economic Engagement can be tactical or structural linkage of economic benefits.

Mastanduno 2008, Michael – Nelson Rockefeller Professor of Government and Associate Dean for the Social Sciences at Dartmouth. “Economic Statecraft” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors & Cases ed Smith, Hadfield, Dunne. p. 182-3

Positive economic statecraft may be defined as the provision or promise of economic benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state. 1 It is important to distinguish between two types. The first involves the promise of a well-specified economic concession in an effort to alter specific foreign or domestic policies of the target government. I call this version tactical linkage; others refer to 'carrots', or 'specific positive linkage'. A second version, which I term structural linkage and which others refer to as 'general positive linkage' or 'long-term engagement', involves an effort to use a steady stream of economic benefits to reconfigure the balance of political interests within a target country. Structural linkage tends to be unconditional; the benefits are not turned on and off according to changes in target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects instead that sustained economic engagement will eventually produce a political transformation and desirable changes in target behaviour.

#### 3. We meet the counter-interpretation.

#### 4. Prefer our interpretation – (More Real World) Mastanduno’s definition considers the end of the Cold War and the processes of globalization.

Mastanduno 2008, Michael – Nelson Rockefeller Professor of Government and Associate Dean for the Social Sciences at Dartmouth. “Economic Statecraft” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors & Cases ed Smith, Hadfield, Dunne. p. 182-3

Tactical linkage and long-term engagement are each informed by a different logic. Tactical linkage operates at a more immediate level; the sanctioning state calculates that the provision of a particular type of economic reward will be sufficient to convince policy makers in the target to reconsider their existing policies. For example, immediately after the Second World War, the United States offered sizable reconstruction loans to Britain, France, and the Soviet Union- in exchange for political concessions. The British and French were generally willing to accommodate US demands that they liberalize their domestic and foreign economic policies; the Soviets were not. In 1973, European states and Japan offered economic inducements in the form of aid and trade concessions to Arab states during the OPEC crisis in a largely successful attempt to assure that they would receive access to oil supplies at predictable prices. In 1982, the United States offered to increase sa les of coal to its West European allies to discourage them from a gas pipeline deal with the Soviet Union. This influence attempt failed. Long-term engagement, however, works at a deeper level, and its logic was most clearly articulated in the classic work of Albert Hirschman (Hirschman, 1945 [ 1980]). The sanctioning government provides an ongoing stream of economic benefits which gradually transform domestic political interests in the target state. Over time, ' internationalist' coalitions that favour interdependence with the sanctioning state will form and strengthen, and will exert influence over the policy of the weaker state in a direction preferred by the sanctioning state. Hirschman demonstrated how Nazi Germany used an array of economic inducements to inculcate economic dependence, and eventually political acquiescence, on the part of its weaker central European neighbours during the interwar period. Political scientists have traditionally devoted relatively little attention to positive economic statecraft. There are, for example, no databases of instances of economic inducement, with assessments of success and fai lure, along the lines of what Hufbauer et al. and Jentleson have compiled for negative economic sanctions. Economic sticks have commanded more attention than economic carrots. This was especially true during the Cold War, when the two dominant powers and their respective alliances were largely self-sufficient and economically independent of each other. Since there was so little economic cooperation, the study of superpower and inter-bloc economic interaction emphasized economic warfare, : ::- negative sanctions. The end of the Cold War has brought a changed global situation and a revival of scholarly interest in positive economic statecraft. The major powers of the world are now economically interdependent, as they were during the late nineteenth century. An under' standing of great power politics once again requires an understanding of economic relationships and of the links between economics and foreign policy. During the Cold War, US-Soviet relations focused on arms control and the management of political and ideological competition. Today the focus in foreign relations among the United States, European Union, China, Japan, and Russia is as much on issues of economic reform, trade policy, and currency com~ petition as on the traditional 'high politics' of military competition and alliance cooperation. As economic relations take centre stage in foreign policy, the traditional lines between high politics and low politics become blurred. It is not surprising that scholars have begun to rediscover the agenda of positive economic statecraft. The Cold War endgame and in particular Germany's reunification highlighted the key role of economic inducements. Beginning in 1969, West Germany used economic statecraft to build the political foundation for reconciliation with one of its most distrustful neighbours, Poland. When West Germany finally seized the opportunity to reunify in 1989, a reassured Poland did not stand in the way (Davis, \_000) . Similarly, West German leaders used a steady stream of economic inducements over two decades to inculcate Soviet dependence on German commerce and credits and to signal Germany's benign foreign policy intentions. Soviet leader Gorbachev counted on Germany, more so than any other Western state, to provide much-needed economic support. The German government responded in 1989-1990 with food aid and sizable economic credits. The clinchers, which paved the way for Russian acquiescence to unification on Germany's terms, included a five billion deutschmark credit, a willingness to allow Russia to buy goods from the eastern zone of Germany with roubles rather than hard currency, and a commitment to provide financial support for the post-unification resettlement of the Red Army in Russia (Newnham, 2002). Since the end of the Cold War, economic engagement has proved to be a key foreign policy strategy in relations both among major powers and between stronger and weaker states. The United States and European Union have used economic incentives, with mixed success, in an effort to integrate Russia and Central and Eastern Europe into a Western-centred world political economy. European states view economic engagement as the appropriate strategy to adopt with regard to a potentially revisionist Iran; the United States prefers economic containment. China has sought to deepen economic interdependence with Taiwan as a means to reduce incentives for Taiwanese independence. Most prominently, the United States has adopted economic engagement as the focal point of its strategy toward a rising potential challenger, China. US officials recognize that China's integration into the world economy will increase its economic and potential military power. But they also expect-or hope-that the very process of integration will soften Chinese intentions and encourage China to be a more accommodating, rather than a more revisionist, rising power. A good part of the future of international politics hinges on the outcome of this high stakes experiment in economic statecraft.

#### 5. Their interpretation fails. The negative conflates the *means* and the *ends* of engagement policy – Economic policy has economic means – defining in terms of the ends would include nuclear war as economic policy because it has economic effects.

David Baldwin 1985 Senior Political Scientist, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Economic Statecraft “What is Economic Statecraft?” pp. 29-50

The term "foreign economic policy" is sometimes used in much the¶ same way as "economic statecraft" is used here . Other uses, however,¶ should be noted. Benjamin Cohen and Robert Pastor define it in terms of¶ governmental actions intended to affect the international economic environment.¶ 17 An important drawback to this conception is that it makes it¶ definitionally impossible to consider foreign economic policy as an option¶ when a statesman wants to affect the noneconomic aspects of the international¶ environment, say the international climate of opinion with respect¶ to the legitimacy of the government of Rhodesia . Rational adaptation of¶ means to ends in foreign policy making is not facilitated by defining some¶ policy options in terms of particular ends. Still another objection to this¶ definition is that it says nothing about the means to be used , thus leaving¶ open the possibility that the use of noneconomic techniques, such as threats¶ of violence, could be considered foreign economic policy. Such a possibility¶ strays needlessly from common usage. I. M. Destler offers a definition of "foreign economic policy" in terms¶ of the actual impact of governmental actions on foreign and economic concerns. 18 This definition implies nothing whatever about either the means¶ used or the effect intended; instead it focuses on the actual effects intended¶ or not. Thus, a nuclear war could be labeled as ''foreign economic¶ policy'' if it had important side effects on foreign economic matters. Any¶ conception of foreign economic policy that cannot differentiate between¶ nuclear attack and trade restrictions is hopelessly at odds with common¶ usage. Any conception of "policy" that ignores both means and ends is¶ unlikely to be of much use in assessing the rationality of a given policy.

#### 7. Reasonability – Economic engagement is hard to define – there’s no one analytical way to limit it – reject their arbitrary interpretations…..

Bayne & Woolcock 2011 Sir Nicholas Bayne, KCMG, is a Fellow at the International Trade Policy Unit of the London School of Economics and Political Science. He also teaches at the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University. As a British diplomat, he was High Commissioner to Canada from 1992 to 1996, Economic Director at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1988 to 1992, and Ambassador to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development from 1985 to 1988. Stephen Woolcock is Associate Research Fellow at the Comparative Regional Integration Studies Programme of the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) in Bruges. He is also Programme Director for the Masters in International Political Economy at the London School of Economics, where he teaches international political economy, the political economy of international trade and economic diplomacy. He also heads the LSE’s International Trade Policy Unit, which coordinates research on trade topics, runs training programmes for practitioners and organises seminars that bridge the gap between academic research on trade and policy. The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations

This is a book about how states conduct their international economic relations at the start of the 21st century: how they make decisions domestically; how they negotiate with each other internationally; and how these two processes interact. While states are at the centre of this study, it also includes non-state actors, whose influence on decision-making has grown over the years. This book focuses on the methods and process of decision-making and negotiation, rather than the content of policy. It is not intended to be a manual for negotiators, but rather to explain why governments and other actors in economic diplomacy behave in the way they do. We call this book The New Economic Diplomacy to emphasize how much this activity has changed in the last two decades. For half a century after World War li, economic diplomacy was dominated by permanent officials from the governments of a limited number of countries.’ It was shaped by the constraints of the Cold War. Now, with the advance of globalization since the end of the Cold War, there are far more non-government players, while ministers and heads of government are active alongside their officials. Originally limited to measures taken at the border, economic diplomacy increasingly operates ‘within the frontier’ and influences domestic policy. Above all, a single economic system covers the entire world, with many more countries active in it. New emerging powers, with China in the lead, are growing in influence, while mature economies of North America, Europe and Japan have lost ground after suffering financial collapse and economic recession. All these trends will shape this book. They have gathered pace since its second edition came out in 2007 and we have updated this new version to reflect this. edition came out in 2007 and we have updated this new version to reflect this. There are several reasons to pay attention to the process of international economic decision-making, which we call economic diplomacy. First of all, it fills a gap in current academic studies. The discipline of International Political Economy (IPE) focuses on structural factors, such as the relative power of states or the structures of influence within national economies, rather than on process. But where power relationships are balanced, the process of decision-making and negotiation can determine outcomes, as Professor John Odell has pointed out in his book Negotiating the World Economy (Odell 2000). The examination of economic decision-making also illuminates how governments try to make their policies more efficient and how they respond to pressures for greater democratic accountability. Since the end of the Cold War economic diplomacy, to enhance prosperity, has been the main priority for states in most regions of the world. New security concerns emerged after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and these persist, but the recent financial crisis and ensuing recession have revived the priority given to economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy is not just a subject for academic study. It is an activity pursued by state and non-state actors in the real world of today. In some respects economic diplomacy is like sex: easier to describe if you have practised it yourself. So while much of this book is written by Nicholas Bayne and Steve Woolcock of the LSE, with the help of our colleague Ken Heydon, an integral part of it is contributed by experienced practitioners of economic diplomacy. The practitioner chapters, starting at Chapter 5, provide case studies and illustrations of how economic diplomacy works.

# Economic Engagement

### EE = Sole purpose

#### Interpretation – “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action – it cannot encompass broader forms of engagement

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However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. 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Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

### EE – Limits Key

#### This is only tangible trade and financial benefits --- including political, military, or cultural engagement explodes the topic

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Senior Fellows in the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 5-6

Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid.’2 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market.’ Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of summits between leaders—or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign mffitary officers.’4 These areas of engagement are likely to involve, working with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement. This brief overview of the various forms of engagement illuminates the choices open to policymakers. The plethora of options signals the flexibility of engagement as a foreign policy strategy and, in doing so, reveals one of the real strengths of engagement. At the same time, it also suggests the urgent need for considered analysis of this strategy. The purpose of this book is to address this need by deriving insights and lessons from past episodes of engagement and proposing guidelines for the future use of engagement strategies. Throughout the book, two critical questions are entertained. First, when should policymakers consider engagement? A strategy of engagement may serve certain foreign policy objectives better than others. Specific characteristics of a target country may make it more receptive to a strategy of engagement and the incentives offered under it; in other cases, a country's domestic politics may effectively exclude the use of engagement strategies. Second, how should engagement strategies be managed to maximize the chances of success? Shedding light on how policymakers achieved, or failed, in these efforts in the past is critical in an evaluation of engagement strategies. By focusing our analysis, these questions and concerns help produce a framework to guide the use of engagement strategies in the upcoming decades.

### EE - Precision Key

#### Determining topicality based on economic effect ruins precision and makes any policy topical

Baldwin 85 – David A., Professor of World Order Studies and Political Science at Colombia, Economic Statecraft, p. 33-36

Alternative Concepts As with policy options, the value of a particular conceptualization is best measured by comparing it with available alternatives. Whereas economic statecraft is defined in terms of means, alternative concepts are usually defined in terms of actual or intended effects of a policy or in terms of the process by which the policy was made. Foreign Economic Policy The term "foreign economic policy" is sometimes used in much the same way as "economic statecraft" is used here. Other uses, however, should be noted. Benjamin Cohen and Robert Pastor define it in terms of governmental actions intended to affect the international economic environment.17 An important drawback to this conception is that it makes it definitionally impossible to consider foreign economic policy as an option when a statesman wants to affect the noneconomic aspects of the international environment, say the international climate of opinion with respect to the legitimacy of the government of Rhodesia. Rational adaptation of means to ends in foreign policy making is not facilitated by defining some policy options in terms of particular ends. Still another objection to this definition is that it says nothing about the means to be used, thus leaving open the possibility that the use of noneconomic techniques, such as threats of violence, could be considered foreign economic policy. Such a possibility strays needlessly from common usage. I. M. Destler offers a definition of “foreign economic policy” in terms of the actual impact of governmental actions on foreign and economic concerns. This definition implies nothing whatever about either the means used or the effect intended; instead it focuses on the actual effects— intended or not. Thus, a nuclear war could be labeled as “foreign economic policy” if it had important side effects on foreign economic matters. Any conception of foreign economic policy that cannot differentiate between nuclear attack and trade restrictions is hopelessly at odds with common usage. Any conception of “policy” that ignores both means and ends is unlikely to be of much use in assessing the rationality of a given policy. International Economic Policy Stephen D. Cohen argues that the term "international economic policy" is preferable to the more commonly used phrase, "foreign economic policy." He contends that "international economic policy must be viewed as being a separate phenomenon, not a tool for use by either foreign policy or domestic economic policy officials." The reasons underlying Cohen's position can be summarized as follows: (1) "International economic policy" is the "preferable term because . . . policy making in this area must take account of too many questions of domestic. . . policy to be considered 'foreign.' " (2) "The term 'foreign economic policy' usually connotes a subdivision of foreign policy as a whole and is therefore an oversimplification." And (3) acceptance of international economic policy as a distinct policy area is the "best and quickest way" to improve understanding of the "forces of economics in international economic policy" and of "the global political impact of U.S. international economic policy."19 The following points, however, should be noted in response to Cohen's position: (1) Foreign policy has traditionally been defined in terms of attempts to influence foreigners, not in terms of the factors that should be taken into account in formulating the policy. The fact that making international economic policy requires consideration of foreign and domestic political and economic factors in no way distinguishes it from traditional conceptions of foreign economic policy. (2) It is not self-evident that treating foreign economic policy as a subdivision of foreign policy as a whole constitutes "oversimplification." Cohen provides little evidence or argument to support this contention. Indeed, from an a priori standpoint, it would seem simpler to consider international economic policy by itself than to treat it as part of a larger whole. Treating more variables may lead to overcomplexity, but it rarely leads to oversimplification. And (3) the question of whether Cohen's approach is the "best and quickest way" to enhance understanding is best answered after consideration of alternative At least three common meanings of the term “economic sanctions” may be identified. The first is a rather narrow concept referring to the use of economic measures to enforce international law. The second refers to the types of values that are intended to be reduced or augmented in the target state. And the third usage corresponds to the concept of economic techniques of statecraft as used here. The first is narrowly legalistic and therefore unsuitable for general foreign policy analysis. The second emphasizes intended effects rather than the means for achieving those effects. The difficulty is that any or all of the policy instruments discussed in the previous chapter can be used to ‘affect the economic values in a target state. Diplomatic pressure on other states can be used to discourage trade with the target; propaganda can be used to undermine confidence in the target state’s currency; and military attack can be used to destroy factories. Thus, conceiving of economic sanctions in terms of the intended effects on the receiving state is no help at all in distinguishing economic from noneconomic tools of statecraft. The term “economic sanctions” is used in so many different ways that there is much to be said for avoiding it altogether. Unfortunately, the term is so deeply embedded in the literature of economic statecraft that ignoring it is impossible. Later chapters will therefore use this term, but only in its third sense.

#### Precision in defining engagement is critical to policy analysis.

Resnick 1 (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, )

A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15) Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16) As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative sanctions from which to choose--including covert action, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is only reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm of positive sanctions than simply engagement. Equating engagement with positive sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could be analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies.

### EE - Means not Ends

#### Their interpretation conflates the *means* and the *ends* of engagement policy – Economic policy uses economic tools to achieve policy goals– defining in terms of the ends would include nuclear war as economic policy because it has economic effects.

David Baldwin 1985 Senior Political Scientist, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Economic Statecraft “What is Economic Statecraft?” pp. 29-50

The term "foreign economic policy" is sometimes used in much the¶ same way as "economic statecraft" is used here . Other uses, however,¶ should be noted. Benjamin Cohen and Robert Pastor define it in terms of¶ governmental actions intended to affect the international economic environment.¶ 17 An important drawback to this conception is that it makes it¶ definitionally impossible to consider foreign economic policy as an option¶ when a statesman wants to affect the noneconomic aspects of the international¶ environment, say the international climate of opinion with respect¶ to the legitimacy of the government of Rhodesia . Rational adaptation of¶ means to ends in foreign policy making is not facilitated by defining some¶ policy options in terms of particular ends. Still another objection to this¶ definition is that it says nothing about the means to be used , thus leaving¶ open the possibility that the use of noneconomic techniques, such as threats¶ of violence, could be considered foreign economic policy. Such a possibility¶ strays needlessly from common usage. I. M. Destler offers a definition of "foreign economic policy" in terms¶ of the actual impact of governmental actions on foreign and economic concerns. 18 This definition implies nothing whatever about either the means¶ used or the effect intended; instead it focuses on the actual effects intended¶ or not. Thus, a nuclear war could be labeled as ''foreign economic¶ policy'' if it had important side effects on foreign economic matters. Any¶ conception of foreign economic policy that cannot differentiate between¶ nuclear attack and trade restrictions is hopelessly at odds with common¶ usage. Any conception of "policy" that ignores both means and ends is¶ unlikely to be of much use in assessing the rationality of a given policy.

#### Using the end as focus wrecks topic education

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

Some scholars have excessively narrowed the definition of engagement by defining it according to the ends sought rather than the means employed. For example, Schweller and Wohlforth assert that if any distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement, "it is that the goal of engagement is not simply tension-reduction and the avoidance of war but also an attempt to socialize [a] dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order."(n17) Such ends-based definitions hinder the study of engagement in two ways. First, because the act of policymaking consists of selecting from a variety of alternative means in the pursuit of a given end(s), it stands to reason that policy instruments are more effectively conceptualized in terms of means rather than ends. When defined as different means, policies can be more easily compared with one another across a whole spectrum of discrete ends, in order to gauge more accurately the circumstances under which each policy is relatively more or less effective.(n18) Second, scholars who define engagement as the end of peaceful socialization inevitably create a bias for future empirical research on engagement outcomes. This is because it is difficult to imagine a more ambitious foreign policy objective than the peaceable transformation of a revisionist state that rejects the dominant norms and practices of the international system into a status-quo state that embodies those same norms and practices. The equation of engagement with socialization alone forecloses the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish more modest goals such as tension-reduction. Therefore, all else being equal, scholars using this loaded definition will be predisposed to conclude from examination only of the hardest cases of attempted socialization that the policy is ineffective.(n19) Considering engagement as a set of means would enable analysts to more fairly assess the effectiveness of engagement relative to other policies in achieving an array of ends.

#### Prefer the means rather than the ends to distinguish economic policies.

David Baldwin 1985 Senior Political Scientist, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Economic Statecraft “What is Economic Statecraft?” pp. 29-50

Choosing a concept of economic statecraft is not merely a matter of "semantic taste," at least not if that is meant to imply that " there is no disputing matters of taste .' ' Some concepts are better suited for the analysis of governmental influence attempts than others. In comparison with available alternatives , the concept of " economic statecraft" has several advantages. The most important of these can be summarized as follows: 1. "Economic statecraft" emphasizes means rather than ends . This usage is probably closer to ordinary language than definitions in terms of ends. Bombing a library is not called cultural warfare; bombing homes is not called residential warfare; bombing nuclear reactors (with conventional bombs) is not called nuclear warfare; and bombing factories should not be labeled economic warfare. 2. " Economic statecraft" does not restrict the range of goals that may be sought by economic means. It makes it conceptually possible to describe the empirically undeniable fact that policy makers sometimes use economic means to pursue a wide variety of noneconomic ends. 3. "Economic statecraft" treats policy instruments as property concepts, thus facilitating the maintenance of a clear distinction between undertakings and outcomes. 4. Unlike most alternative concepts, the definition of " economic statecraft" includes a definition of " economic." It thus provides criteria for distinguishing economic techniques of statecraft from noneconomic techniques.

### EE = Tactical or Structural Linkage

#### Economic Engagement can be tactical or structural linkage of economic benefits.

Mastanduno 2008, Michael – Nelson Rockefeller Professor of Government and Associate Dean for the Social Sciences at Dartmouth. “Economic Statecraft” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors & Cases ed Smith, Hadfield, Dunne. p. 182-3

Positive economic statecraft may be defined as the provision or promise of economic benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state. 1 It is important to distinguish between two types. The first involves the promise of a well-specified economic concession in an effort to alter specific foreign or domestic policies of the target government. I call this version tactical linkage; others refer to 'carrots', or 'specific positive linkage'. A second version, which I term structural linkage and which others refer to as 'general positive linkage' or 'long-term engagement', involves an effort to use a steady stream of economic benefits to reconfigure the balance of political interests within a target country. Structural linkage tends to be unconditional; the benefits are not turned on and off according to changes in target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects instead that sustained economic engagement will eventually produce a political transformation and desirable changes in target behaviour.

#### Prefer our interpretation – (More Real World) Mastanduno’s definition considers the end of the Cold War and the processes of globalization.

Mastanduno 2008, Michael – Nelson Rockefeller Professor of Government and Associate Dean for the Social Sciences at Dartmouth. “Economic Statecraft” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors & Cases ed Smith, Hadfield, Dunne. p. 182-3

Tactical linkage and long-term engagement are each informed by a different logic. Tactical linkage operates at a more immediate level; the sanctioning state calculates that the provision of a particular type of economic reward will be sufficient to convince policy makers in the target to reconsider their existing policies. For example, immediately after the Second World War, the United States offered sizable reconstruction loans to Britain, France, and the Soviet Union- in exchange for political concessions. The British and French were generally willing to accommodate US demands that they liberalize their domestic and foreign economic policies; the Soviets were not. In 1973, European states and Japan offered economic inducements in the form of aid and trade concessions to Arab states during the OPEC crisis in a largely successful attempt to assure that they would receive access to oil supplies at predictable prices. In 1982, the United States offered to increase sa les of coal to its West European allies to discourage them from a gas pipeline deal with the Soviet Union. This influence attempt failed. Long-term engagement, however, works at a deeper level, and its logic was most clearly articulated in the classic work of Albert Hirschman (Hirschman, 1945 [ 1980]). The sanctioning government provides an ongoing stream of economic benefits which gradually transform domestic political interests in the target state. Over time, ' internationalist' coalitions that favour interdependence with the sanctioning state will form and strengthen, and will exert influence over the policy of the weaker state in a direction preferred by the sanctioning state. Hirschman demonstrated how Nazi Germany used an array of economic inducements to inculcate economic dependence, and eventually political acquiescence, on the part of its weaker central European neighbours during the interwar period. Political scientists have traditionally devoted relatively little attention to positive economic statecraft. There are, for example, no databases of instances of economic inducement, with assessments of success and fai lure, along the lines of what Hufbauer et al. and Jentleson have compiled for negative economic sanctions. Economic sticks have commanded more attention than economic carrots. This was especially true during the Cold War, when the two dominant powers and their respective alliances were largely self-sufficient and economically independent of each other. Since there was so little economic cooperation, the study of superpower and inter-bloc economic interaction emphasized economic warfare, : ::- negative sanctions. The end of the Cold War has brought a changed global situation and a revival of scholarly interest in positive economic statecraft. The major powers of the world are now economically interdependent, as they were during the late nineteenth century. An under' standing of great power politics once again requires an understanding of economic relationships and of the links between economics and foreign policy. During the Cold War, US-Soviet relations focused on arms control and the management of political and ideological competition. Today the focus in foreign relations among the United States, European Union, China, Japan, and Russia is as much on issues of economic reform, trade policy, and currency com~ petition as on the traditional 'high politics' of military competition and alliance cooperation. As economic relations take centre stage in foreign policy, the traditional lines between high politics and low politics become blurred. It is not surprising that scholars have begun to rediscover the agenda of positive economic statecraft. The Cold War endgame and in particular Germany's reunification highlighted the key role of economic inducements. Beginning in 1969, West Germany used economic statecraft to build the political foundation for reconciliation with one of its most distrustful neighbours, Poland. When West Germany finally seized the opportunity to reunify in 1989, a reassured Poland did not stand in the way (Davis, \_000) . Similarly, West German leaders used a steady stream of economic inducements over two decades to inculcate Soviet dependence on German commerce and credits and to signal Germany's benign foreign policy intentions. Soviet leader Gorbachev counted on Germany, more so than any other Western state, to provide much-needed economic support. The German government responded in 1989-1990 with food aid and sizable economic credits. The clinchers, which paved the way for Russian acquiescence to unification on Germany's terms, included a five billion deutschmark credit, a willingness to allow Russia to buy goods from the eastern zone of Germany with roubles rather than hard currency, and a commitment to provide financial support for the post-unification resettlement of the Red Army in Russia (Newnham, 2002). Since the end of the Cold War, economic engagement has proved to be a key foreign policy strategy in relations both among major powers and between stronger and weaker states. The United States and European Union have used economic incentives, with mixed success, in an effort to integrate Russia and Central and Eastern Europe into a Western-centred world political economy. European states view economic engagement as the appropriate strategy to adopt with regard to a potentially revisionist Iran; the United States prefers economic containment. China has sought to deepen economic interdependence with Taiwan as a means to reduce incentives for Taiwanese independence. Most prominently, the United States has adopted economic engagement as the focal point of its strategy toward a rising potential challenger, China. US officials recognize that China's integration into the world economy will increase its economic and potential military power. But they also expect-or hope-that the very process of integration will soften Chinese intentions and encourage China to be a more accommodating, rather than a more revisionist, rising power. A good part of the future of international politics hinges on the outcome of this high stakes experiment in economic statecraft.

#### Economic Engagement must be long term structural linkage.

Pollins 3 (Brian M., Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University and a Research Fellow at the Mershon Center, Edward Deering Mansfield, Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, Michigan Studies in International Political Economy, Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, 2003)

The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-term, transformative strategy. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other states to want what you want, rather than to do what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.

### EE = Interdependence

#### Engagement should be defined as interdependence.

Dueck 6 (Colin, assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and the author of Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy, “Strategies for Managing Rogue States,” Orbis Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 223–241, )

Engagement, a popular concept in recent years, actually has several possible meanings and is used in a number of different ways. It can refer to (1) a stance of diplomatic or commercial activism internationally;8 (2) the simple fact of ongoing political or economic contact with an existing counterpart or adversary; (3) using such political or economic contact as a strategy in itself, in the hopes that this contact will create patterns of cooperation, integration, and interdependence with a rogue state;9 (4) a strategy under which international adversaries enter into a limited range of cooperative agreements, alongside continued rivalry or competition;10 or (5) the very act of diplomacy, negotiating, or bargaining, regardless of its content. Only the third definition, focusing on integration through contact, is analytically useful. The first is too vague to be of much use; the second is a condition rather than a strategy; the fourth is more accurately captured by détente; and as to the last definition, there is no compelling reason to abandon the words “diplomacy,” “negotiating,” or “bargaining” when they have served very well up to now.11

#### Economic engagement is the manipulation of economic power to influence the behavior of other countries.

Borer 2004   
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Engagement in Practice: U.S. Relations with Iraq, 1982-1990 ¶ Engagement serves as a core policy doctrine of U.S. national security strategy in the twenty-first ¶ century.1¶ In practice, implementing engagement relies heavily on the manipulation on the economic ¶ elements of national power, primarily in the areas of trade and finance, to influence the behavior of other ¶ states. Engagement uses economic interdependence, or mutual dependence, to create ties that, in theory, ¶ should bind states together. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye suggest that economic interdependence should ¶ be understood in terms of the power to influence, or the effects on each state of their trade linkages. Indeed, ¶ as many scholars have indicated, states have long recognized the truth that power generally flows from ¶ asymmetrical (or imbalanced) interdependence.2¶ In keeping with this tradition, Keohane and Nye stress that ¶ when planning an effective diplomatic strategy, It is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to ¶ provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often ¶ use the interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect ¶ other issues.î3¶ At its core, economic statecraft is founded on the principle of asymmetrical power.

#### Building economic ties across borders.

Ike 2013 Dr Pius Ike Department of Agricultural Economics, Nigeria, The Role of Economic Development in Peacebuilding, Paper presented at PIND’s Niger Delta Development Forum– Supporting Poverty Reduction through Partnership, Held at Novotel, Port-Harcourt, 21 -22 November 2012 http://ndpifoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Paper-presented-at-NDDF/Paper%206%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20Economic%20Development%20in%20Peacebuilding.pdf

Cross-Border Economic Engagement: Building economic ties across international boundaries adds an additional layer of complexity due to the politicized nature of borders and the increased vigilance of the concerned states and their regional neighbors. Local businesses can act as a powerful constituency for peace under these circumstances, nurturing economic interdependence and advocating for reform when political tensions preclude other forms of engagement.

### EE = Cross border investment

#### Economic Engagement is cross-border investment.

McCann 2013 “The North East (NELEP) Area in the Context of the Global Economy”, Paper Commissioned as an Independent Expert ‘Thinkpiece’ for the North of England Independent Economic Review Philip McCann holds The University of Groningen Endowed Chair of Economic Geography. Philip is one of the world’s most highly cited economic geographers and spatial economists of his generation. He is co-editor of Papers in Regional Science, co-editor of Spatial Economic Analysis, and Series Editor of the Edward Elgar book series New Horizons in Regional Science. <http://www.nelep.co.uk/ne-economic-review/evidence/>

Much of the recent increase in global trade over the last two and a half decades is related to the increasing geographical fragmentation of the value-chains comprising the internal production activities of multinationals from advanced economies. In the modern era of globalization, international economic engagement is at least as much about increasing cross-border investment and engagement as it is about changes in gross or net exports and imports. The enormous disruption caused by the Global Financial Crisis means that the world is actually now less globally connected than it was in 2007 prior to the crisis. Although there has been clear evidence of a return to the trend towards increasing global trade and global connectedness, the modest gains since 2009 are still not yet strong enough to re-capture the previous levels of connectedness, and where such gains have taken place they are primarily in goods trade and not in services.

### EE is not Commerce

#### “Economic” engagement broadly establishes the framework for individual transactions --- facilitating trade makes the plan “commercial”

Woolcock 13 – Stephen Woolcock, Lecturer in International Relations at The London School of Economics, and Sir Nicholas Bayne, Fellow at the International Trade Policy Unit of the London School of Economics, The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, p. 387

Before suggesting some ways in which economic diplomacy could be seen as a distinct branch of diplomacy it is helpful to limit the scope of the term by saying what it is not. Our definition of economic diplomacy does not include the use of economic leverage, either in the form of sanctions or inducement, in the pursuit of specific political or strategic goals. This we would define as sanctions or perhaps economic statecraft.2 Economic diplomacy is about the creation and distribution of the economic benefits from international economic relations. Clearly political and strategic interests will be a factor in economic negotiations, whether in terms of promoting a liberal, capitalist world order or in choosing negotiating partners tor trade agreements. 'I he conclusion of a trade or economic agreement can be seen as a means of promoting economic stability, growth, and employment and thus political stability in a country, such as in the countries of North Africa that have undergone reform since the spring of 2011. But the means remain the economic agreement, the substance of which will be shaped by a range of domestic sectoral and other interests. In other words, political objectives will not infrequently be a factor in decisions to initiate negotiations, but the concrete agenda, content, and conduct of the negotiations will be largely determined by economic factors and interests. We include international environment negotiations in our definition of economic diplomacy because of the close interdependence between economic and environmental objectives. By extension we also see economic diplomacy as an integrated part of a grand strategy combining political, military, and economic relations. Nor does our definition of economic diplomacy include the promotion of exports or investment, whether outward or inward. While governments have always intervened to promote their national industries, there has been a trend towards more active involve­ment of foreign services or even diplomatic services in seeking markets for national companies in recent decades.\* This differs from more traditional industrial policy or mercantilist trade policies. As traditional forms of intervention such as tariffs, subsidies, and other instruments that used to promote national champions have been disciplined by WTO and other trade regimes, governments have used diplomatic links, trade fairs, or visits of heads of state to promote commercial interests. Such activities are better cap­tured by the term commercial diplomacy, which contrasts with economic diplomacy; the latter facilitates trade and investment by establishing the framework of rules and disciplines within which markets and such commercial diplomacy function.4

#### “Economic” engagement uses economic means for specific foreign policy objectives --- merely altering trade is “commerce”

Saner 3 – Dr. Raymond Saner, Professor in Organization and International Management at the University of Basle, “International Economic Diplomacy: Mutations in Post-modern Times”, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, p. 12-13

Efforts by specialised Ministries to conduct policy related international negotiations and to influence the structure and mechanisms of global governance have eclipsed the previous prominence of MOFAs in economic and trade arenas. The rise of this non-traditional genre of multi-ministry international diplomacy is for instance apparent in Genera where many industrialised countries' Embassies to the WTO are staffed by a greater number of officials than is the case at their bilateral Embassies to Switzerland in Berne. The greater number of staff is mostly due to the ever increasing number of non-MOFA diplomats and government officials. Economic diplomacy conducted by MOFA or other government ministry officials has been defined as follows: Economic diplomacy is concerned with economic policy issues, e.g. work of delegations at standard setting organisations such as WTO and BIS. Economic diplomats also monitor and report on economic policies in foreign countries and give the home government advice on how to best influence them. Economic Diplomacy employ's economic resources, either as rewards or sanctions, in pursuit of a particular foreign policy objective. This is sometimes called "economic statecraft"." Governments are also keen to support national economic development by providing support to their own enterprises for instance in the form of export advice, legal assistance, export incentives and backstopping when needed. Such support includes helping national enterprises establish subsidiaries in other markets. At the same time, their function can also include the provision of support to foreign enterprises interested in investing in the respective country. Commercial diplomacy on the other hand describes the work of diplomatic missions in support of the home country's business and finance sectors in their pursuit of economic success and the country's general objective of national development. It includes the promotion of inward and outward investment as well as trade. Important aspects of a commercial diplomats' work is the supplying of information about export and investment opportunities and organising and helping to act as hosts to trade missions from home. In some cases, commercial diplomats could also promote economic ties through advising and support of both domestic and foreign companies for investment decisions.

### EE – Not Commercial

#### Commercial exchanges are not economic engagement.

Dr. Klaus E. Knorr, 1977 professor emeritus of public affairs at Princeton University and the director of its Center of International Studies “International Economic Leverage and¶ Uses” Economic Issues and National Security p. 99-126

The four purposes of using economic leverage are, of course, analytical distinctions. In the real world, some of these purposes may be combined in a particular policy. For instance, something of value may be withheld from a country in order both to weaken and to coerce it; or a position of influence may be cultivated by economic means for the purpose of generating friendship and, should this objective fail, for developing a basis for economic coercion. What all four purposes have in common is the achievement of preferred outcomes in relationships with the outside world. As we shall see, national economic wealth affords international economic leverage only to the extent that it has appropriate structural characteristics. For the sake of analytical completion, however, one must add that such wealth also affords the ability to buy things of value from other countries-not only commercial goods and services but also other objects such as naval bases, port facilities, airfields, votes in the U.N. These items are bought as pure exchanges and are not exercises of economic power. In a pure exchange, two parties voluntarily trade things regarded as equivalent in value. No influence is brought to bear, no side is meant to be supported or injured, and no general influence is established. For example, in a recent treaty between the United States and Spain (1976), the former exchanged $1.2 billion in economic aid and other benefits for the use of military bases in Spain over a five-year period. This important use of wealth-that is, the use of international "purchasing Power"-is not discussed below, because it does not represent the employment of leverage as previously defined.

### EE can be Private Sector

#### Economic Engagement can be to the private sector.

Haass & O’Sullivan 2000 Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations since July 2003, prior to which he was Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State and a close advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell. Meghan L. O'Sullivan former deputy national security adviser on Iraq and Afghanistan. She is Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs,[2] and senior fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy p. 11

Particularly when the economy of the target state is not state dominated, the provision of economic incentives to the private sector can be an effective mode of unconditional engagement. In more open economic climates, some of the benefits of economic interaction may accrue to the regime or to the political elites who support it; yet in all likelihood, some economic actors nourished by the exchanges made possible under economic engagement will be agents for change and natural allies in some Western causes. To the extent that economic engagement builds the private sector and other nonstate ac tors within the target country, it is likely to widen the base of support for engagement with America specifically and the promotion of international norms more generally. Certainly, U.S. engagement with China has nurtured pockets sympathetic, if not to American ideals per se, then at least to trade and open economic markets and the maintenance of good relations to se cure them.

### EE - Not just adversary

#### Economic leverage isn’t just used with enemy states – also used to cultivate relationships with allies.

Dr. Klaus E. Knorr, 1977 professor emeritus of public affairs at Princeton University and the director of its Center of International Studies “International Economic Leverage and¶ Uses” Economic Issues and National Security p. 99-126

Conversely, states use economic leverage to strengthen foreign national economies and governments, because they are interested in thetr viability or in their capacity to resist external threats or enemies in international or internal war. We need not detail these practices, for the historical record is replete with cases. The United States alone has, during and since World War II, supported numerous allies and client states around the globe. The Soviet Union and China have widely engaged in this practice-massive Soviet aid to Cuba being a prime example. Ex-colonial powers-such as France--have supported former colonies; Arab oil-producing countries, especially Saudi Arabia, have supported Egypt and Syria, etc. In 1974, the Federal Republic of Germany lent Italy five billion marks in order to help the Italian government, which faced the prospect of electoral losses to the Communist~ party, to weather a serious balance-of-payments crisis. In 1976, the struggling democratic regime in Portugal received aid from West Germany and France, and the United States announced similar plans. In some of these cases, to be sure, to establish a general position of influence--a purpose discussed 10 the next section-has been an objective associated with the aim of strengthening a friendly state or government. Finally, countries that are better off economically give aid to those that are worse off through international organizations, especially the specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Although motivations of self-interest in terms of cultivating an international reputation for doing good may not be entirely absent, the official intention is to give diffuse support to the welfare and economic development of poorer societies.

### “Economic Engagement” Phrase Key

#### Defining just economic or just engagement doesn’t work in terms of foreign economic policy – interpretations must help evaluate policy options – defining the terms alone only confuses the issue.

David Baldwin 1985 Senior Political Scientist, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Economic Statecraft “What is Economic Statecraft?” pp. 29-50

No portion of the vocabulary of statecraft is more in need of conceptual tidying up than that relating to economic techniques. In a study of U.S. foreign economic policy one author asserts that most of those who have written on this subject ''are narrators of events rather than conceptual izers'' and that ''there are few important terms which are used so often and so loosely. " 3 Some writers are hostile to conceptual analysis . Sidney Weintraub, for example, refers to such questions as matters of "semantic taste." Expressing his wish not " to be diverted by a semantic distinction," he asserts that the cases in his book "speak for themselves about the extent of persuasion, pressure, and coercion being used .' '4 In a similar spirit, Angela Stent explicitly declines to define "economic or political levers," the two central concepts in her study of economic statecraft in West GermanSoviet relations. Noting that such definitions "would be too abstract for the purposes of this analysis," she announces her intention to "distinguish between economic and political levers in a concrete context. " 5 To imply that such distinctions can be made in ''concrete contexts ' ' without reference to abstract criteria is tantamount to ''letting the facts speak for themselves.'' The facts, however, never "speak for themselves," but rather must be interpreted in terms of a conceptual framework imposed by the analyst. Conceptual analysis is neither impossible nor merely a matter of taste; it is a necessary first step toward clear thinking about economic statecraft. In selecting a concept of economic statecraft for this study, two criteria are especially important. First, does the concept help with the identification and evaluation of policy options? And second, does it avoid unnecessary departures from common usage?6 " Ordinary language," however, does not necessarily mean the way most people would define the term, but rather the "set of rules they implicitly follow when applying it to a given situation. " 7 In the previous chapter economic techniques of statecraft were defined as governmental influence attempts relying primarily on resources that have ~ reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money. Although the rationale for defining techniques of statecraft in terms of influence attempts was covered in the previous chapter, the justification for defining "economic" in terms of money prices was postponed until now. Not everyone would agree that this is worthwhile. Klaus Knorr, for example, focuses his attention on explicating the concepts of power and influence, while virtually ignoring economic concepts. He defends this by asserting that "the conceptualization of economic phenomena ... [can be taken] for granted, because it is highly standardized and easily accessible in good textbooks . " 8 Thus, when Knorr defines "economic power" in terms of "economic policy, " 9 it is presumably all right since one has only to consult a ''good textbook'' in order to ascertain criteria for distinguishing economic from noneconomic policy. The best known textbook available, however, is not very helpful in this respect. Paul A. Samuelson's Economics lists six different definitions of economics and notes that the list could be extended "many times over." 10 Some of these are clearly unacceptable for differentiating economic from noneconomic statecraft. For example, to define economic activities as those which involve exchange transactions among people regardless of whether money is used is to include many areas of social life not normally considered to be ''economic.'' The social exchange theorists have demonstrated that the exchange of status, favors, respect, love, friendship, and so on are ubiquitous in social life; 11 yet few economists or noneconomists would label such exchanges as "economic." Similarly, to define economics as the "study of how to improve society" 12 is too broad to be helpful in defining economic statecraft. An equally broad definition favored by some economists depicts economics as "a science responsible for the study of human behavior as the relationship between ends and means which have alternative uses." t3 So defined , it encompasses the whole field of means-ends analysis and is utterly worthless for distinguishing economic techniques of statecraft from other techniques . In defining economic statecraft or economic power, as in other areas of intellectual inquiry, it is risky to take agreement on basic concepts for granted.'

#### Prefer evidence that defines the phrase “economic engagement” as a whole --- “engagement” alone gets distorted based on specific context and clouds understanding of the topic

Capie 2 – David H. Capie, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and Paul M. Evans, Co-CEO and Chairman of the Executive Council of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, , The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, p. 118

According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the noun engagement and the verb to engage have several different meanings. Among these, to engage can mean "to employ busily", "to hold a person's attention", "to bind by a promise (usually a marriage)", or to "come into battle with an enemy". The noun engagement can mean "the act or state of engaging or being engaged", an "appointment with another person", "a betrothal", "an encounter between hostile forces", or "a moral commitment". The gerund engaging means to be "attractive or charming". In the literature on security in the Asia-Pacific, engagement most commonly refers to policies regarding the People's Republic of China. However, the term has been used in many different ways leading to a great deal of confusion and uncertainty. A Business Week headline summed up the confusion: "Does 'engagement' mean fight or marry?"1 Although one of the most important and ubiquitous terms in the Asia-Pacific security discourse, engagement is generally under-theorized. Most of the literature on the term is either descriptive or prescriptive. There is little agreement about the meaning of engagement and considerable inconsistency in its use. The New York Times noted that "there are many definitions of engagement" and described it as a "moving target".2 This indeterminacy has prompted a host of scholars and officials to offer their own modified interpretations of engagement, for example *deep engagement* or *conditional engagement*. These, in turn, have arguably made for less, rather than greater conceptual clarity.

#### Many types of “engagement” exist. Meaningful debate demands precision about the term.

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, Survival, 42(2), Summer, p. 1-2

The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

Today’s rapidly globalising world, no longer beset by Cold War competitions, creates new possibilities for engagement as a foreign-policy option. In particular, the growing recognition of the drawbacks of punitive policies in this new environment has spurred a search for alternative strategies. There are increasing doubts about the wisdom of using sanctions, particularly when exerted unilaterally in a globalised world economy, to dissuade problem regimes from their agendas. Not only has the record of sanctions in forcing change been poor, but the costs of such policies to civilian populations and American commercial interests has often been substantial. Just as faith in sanctions has been shaken, the limits of military force have been exposed: despite relentless bombings, Saddam Hussein remains in power, and events in Kosovo demonstrate how even the most carefully orchestrated military campaign can result in serious collateral damages.

Moreover, the dissolution of Cold War alignments has both opened new opportunities for engagement strategies and created new rationales for them. Due to the heightened economic vulnerability and strategic insecurity of former Soviet allies, the incentives that the US can offer have new potency. At the same time, because America’s allies are freer to shape their foreign-policy agendas subject to their own desires, the US needs to seek out policies with appeal which extends beyond rigid American preferences. During the 1990s, many of America’s closest allies in Europe revealed a preference for using incentives rather than punitive actions to achieve foreign-policy goals.2

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

### A2: Contextual Interpretations

#### Engagement alone is ineffective and results in policy uncertainty

Hayden 13 (Dr. Craig Hayden is an assistant professor in the International Communication Program at American University's School of International Service. “Engagement” is More Convenient than Helpful: Dissecting a Public Diplomacy Term.”, [http://intermap.org/2013/06/20/engagement-is-more-convenient-than-helpful-dissecting-a-public-diplomacy-term ///HK](http://intermap.org/2013/06/20/engagement-is-more-convenient-than-helpful-dissecting-a-public-diplomacy-term%20///HK))

The term “engagement” is a floating signifier; its meaning is typically embedded in the context of the articulation – who is saying it, in what venue, to serve a particular argument claim, etc. It’s a form of jargon that informs practice, and helps to rationalize acts of public diplomacy into the larger strategic language for US diplomacy. We need only look to the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review to see how a broader strategic mandate for “engagement” animates US strategy. Naming this as jargon, however, is not necessarily enlightening, as diplomatic practice is crowded with a lot of jargon. The term engagement matters because it implies a specific practice, to facilitate a certain objective or outcome, and yet it doesn’t actually identify a practice. And as Wallin notes, it’s hard to discern engagement in relation to public diplomacy if we don’t have some standards or definition. Public diplomacy watchers and scholars may “know it when they see it,” but I’m not sure how this helps provide constructive critique.

#### Contextual uses of “engagement” are virtually infinite and ruin precision

Traub 10 – James Traub, Fellow of the Center for International Cooperation and Contributing Writer for the New York Times Magazine, “Terms of Engagement”, Foreign Policy, 2-19, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/19/terms\_of\_engagement?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

Virtually all conversations with Obama administration foreign-policy officials, no matter where they begin, come to rest at "engagement" -- that vexing, mutable, all-purpose word. The U.S. president has "engaged" with rogue states, civil society, the United Nations, and citizens around the globe. Iran vindicates the policy of engagement -- or discredits it. China is a failure of engagement, Russia a success. Inside the Obama realm, engagement has come to mean "good diplomacy." To critics on both the left and right, however, it has come to mean "bad diplomacy" -- cynical or naive, depending on which side you come from. These days -- these shaky days -- the critics seem to be gaining the upper hand, making those Obama officials increasingly defensive about their policy toward autocratic states, whether in the Middle East or Eurasia, Iran or Sudan. Having spent years thinking hard thoughts in universities and think tanks, magazines and books, they cannot believe that they are losing the definitional war over their own policy. They are eager, and maybe a little desperate, to set things aright. And so it was, earlier this week, that when I asked to talk to one official about democracy promotion, I wound up having a 75-minute phone conversation with four White House figures, much of it about "engagement." "A lot of the baggage we carry," said an officeholder I might as well designate as Senior Official #1 -- the conversation was on background and the White House that offered up these folks to defend the policy was insistent they not do so on the record -- "is the word 'engagement.' People hear the word and they think 'constructive engagement.'" I'm not sure this is true outside certain New England common rooms, but it's definitely not an association the Obama White House would like to encourage. After all, Ronald Reagan's administration used that expression to justify the United States's ongoing relationship with South Africa's apartheid government, a policy widely derided as a cynical pretext to preserve ties with a Cold War ally. And it failed. If "constructive engagement" is one definition the Obamans are eager to avoid, another is straightforward, old-fashioned Kissingerian "realism" -- if by realism one means dealing with the interests of states, including brutal states, to the exclusion of those of ordinary citizens. As another interlocutor -- call him Senior Official #2 -- growing rather hot under the telephonic collar, put it, "A lot of my friends said, 'You guys are a bunch of engagement realists. They'll never talk about democracy and human rights.'" Barack Obama himself arguably encouraged this view during his 2008 presidential campaign by criticizing George W. Bush's moralistic bluster, by regularly expressing his high regard for archrealists like James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, and by stipulating his willingness to meet "without preconditions" with even the worst tyrants. And since becoming president he has muted criticism of the regimes in Sudan and Burma, and referred respectfully to "the Islamic Republic of Iran." The allegation of realpolitik is still intolerable -- even baffling -- to these officials, who pledged themselves to Obama out of a deep faith in his redemptive promise. But if engagement rests upon the expectation that treating autocrats and theocrats with respect will significantly alter their behavior, then it suffers less from cynicism than from credulity -- which is the other article of baggage under which engagement now staggers. How can anyone believe that? Administration officials have been at pains to deny that they ever did, especially since Iran has trampled Obama's entreaties underfoot. The goal of engaging Iran, they now say, was not to change Iran's behavior but to change the behavior of more tractable states, like Russia and China, by showing that the United States was willing to go the last mile even with the Axis of Evil. Of course, there is abundant evidence that Obama and some of his chief advisors really did hope that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would moderate nuclear policy if they showed due regard for his country's national interests, as Helene Cooper recently noted in the New York Times. But it's also true that from the outset, officials have made the secondary argument for the virtues of engagement. The SOs insisted to me, as other SOs have in the past, that Obama's Iran policy in fact constitutes a triumph of engagement because Russia has increasingly come around to the American view on the imperative for sanctions. They argue that the Russian change of heart owes not only to the country's growing alarm over Iranian ambitions, but also to the White House's persistent effort to put relations with Russia on a less adversarial footing than they were at the end of the Bush years. We have engaged with Russia and reaped the benefits. Of course, Russia hasn't yet signed on to a tough sanctions measure against Iran; and China, which so far has pocketed Obama's shows of deference without much display of gratitude, may scotch the whole affair. Let us stipulate, then, that engagement is not quite so naive as it appears. But is it not, still, a realist bargain, trading away those universal values that the president so often evokes in the hopes of geostrategic wins, whether on Iran or climate change or the global economy? "We're trying to say 'no,'" says SO #2. "We're not going to accept that tradeoff. We're going to do this in parallel." Trying, of course, isn't doing. But in Russia, this official argues, Obama successfully lowered the temperature with President Dmitry Medvedev while still meeting with dissidents and civil society groups, and he criticized the country's undemocratic elections last fall. And it was "parallel," not a "tradeoff": Obama didn't offer to go easy on human rights, or for that matter missile defense, to get an arms deal, nor did he insist that progress on arms control would depend on democratization. There is a term for such a nuanced policy: "double-track engagement," an expression used by George Shultz, secretary of state during Reagan's second term, who pursued national interests while at the same time helping to pry open such autocratic Cold War allies as Chile and the Philippines. And since Obama, unlike Reagan, puts real store by the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, he is in fact practicing a yet more nuanced "triple-track engagement" -- with states, with peoples, and with international bodies. The United States has rejoined the Human Rights Council, paid up its U.N. dues, and promoted the G-20 over the G-8. It became clear enough, after 75 minutes, that engagement is not one thing, or two things. It's three or four things. It's "multifaceted and complex." It's complicated because the world is complicated. Maybe that's why the Obama administration clings to its favorite word -- because complicated is hard to explain. Simple policies, like Bush's Freedom Agenda, afford immediate gratification -- and then deep disappointment down the road. Nuanced, many-things-at-once policies require patience and a tolerance for ambiguous victories. We now have abundant evidence that this is not a patient or tolerant moment. You have to wonder how long complicated can survive in the absence of big wins. All of which leaves our senior officials increasingly defensive. "Does it take time to get a bureaucracy oriented around the idea of multitrack diplomacy?" asked SO #1. "All the habits of interaction are binary. So it does." Sometimes, as in China or Egypt, engagement with the state seems to preclude engagement with the aspirations of citizens and you get, well, realism. Other times, folks like us just don't get it. Of course, we might feel less confused if the Obamans used some term other than "engagement" to cover virtually everything they do.

### A2: Overlimits

#### Our interpretation allows sufficient Aff flexibility

Bayne 7 – Sir Nicholas Bayne, Fellow at the International Trade Policy Unit of the London School of Economics, and Stephen Woolcock, Lecturer in International Relations at The London School of Economics, The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations, p. 4

Economic diplomacy is best defined not by its instruments but by the economic *issues* that provide its content. We follow the same categories as used by Odell in determining the scope of economic negotiation: 'policies relating to production, movement or exchange of goods, services, investments (including official development assistance), money, information and their regulation’ (Odell 2000. 11). This is a very wide range of issues. A single volume could not cover them all and, of necessity, this book is selective. It concentrates on the central issues of trade, finance, energy and the global environment. These are topics of high political profile, which arouse strong popular concern and bring out well the interplay between different actors in economic diplomacy

### Topic Education Impact

#### Topic education --- blurring the line of “economic” creates definitional chaos that precludes any understanding of engagement

van Bergeijk 11 – Dr. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, Professor of International Economics and Macroeconomics at the Institute of Social Studies at Erasmus University, Economic Diplomacy: Economic and Political Perspectives, p. 8-9

Clearly, there is a need for improved understanding of economic diplomacy's activities, tools and goals. This article contributes to this debate, and proposes a conceptual and an analytical framework of economic diplomacy. The reasons for this are threefold. First, the distinction between economic diplomacy and related concepts is imperative in order to bring order in the definitional chaos. What differentiates economic diplomacy from economic statecraft, economic security, trade diplomacy, commercial diplomacy and financial diplomacy — and how do these concepts relate? Second, a better conceptualization of economic diplomacy is useful in order to address practical questions, such as how to deal with the artificial distinction between the public and private sectors. Finally, improved understanding of both the theory and practice of economic diplomacy grows in importance because of shifting power balances. Latecomer countries — including Asian, post-colonial and transition states — are strengthening their role and influence in global politics and economics in a system that has long been dominated by Western countries. Confronted with the viscosity of global governance and international political and financial institutions, the governments of these emerging countries primarily use economic tools and commercial relations to strengthen their position in international politics. The proposed (re)definition of economic diplomacy adds to the existing literature by spurring a meaningful reorganization of the diversity of institutional frameworks in the fields of diplomacy, economic studies and security in general.5 The conceptual and analytical frameworks that are proposed here must therefore be judged by their purpose — that is, to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena that would remain disconnected and unintelligible without them. The fundamental questions are, first, what is meant by 'economic' in economic diplomacy? That is, are we talking about economic goals (such as enhancing economic prosperity), economic tools (including using deprivation of access to products and funds as political leverage) or economic motives (for example, promoting one's own industry)? Second, what is meant by 'diplomacy'? How is diplomacy different from policy, or what distinguishes economic diplomacy from foreign economic policy? Answers to these questions are sought through review and analysis of the available literature in the fields of international relations (1R), economics, international political economics (IPE), and diplomatic studies.

# Aff

#### See also interpretations above for other aff cards depending on the instance.

### Toward

#### Toward means in the direction of

Michigan Supreme Court 1914 [Michigan Reports: Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of Michigan, Volume 180, Google Books]

Under 3 Comp. Laws, § 11510 (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 14559), providing that “any person who shall discharge without injury to any other person, any firearm, while intentionally, without malice, aimed at or toward any person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,” etc., acts carelessly done, without design to do mischief, are punishable.¶ 2. Same—“Toward”—Construction of Statute.¶ It is sufficient, in a prosecution for violating the statute, to show that the accused was making use of a rifle pointed in the direction of a passenger on a car and discharged the weapon in that direction, without striking any one. The word “toward” means in a course or line leading in the direction of.

### Border Infrastructure is Economic Engagement

#### Border infrastructure improvements are economic engagement – they should be considered alongside trade, aid, and development policies

Gephardt 2002,   
Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo) was the House Democratic Leader. CENTER FOR Latin AmericanStudies UC Berkeley “Progressive Economic Engagement with Mexico and the World” Winter http://clas.berkeley.edu/Publications/Review/pdf/newswinter02.pdf

Everybody agrees that as we enter the 21st century, the global economy requires the United States to seek greater export opportunities. In addition, I believe that a new trade consensus must be rooted in our values. Not only is enhanced trade vital to U.S. economic growth and security, but it can also promote values fundamental to our democratic future: worker rights, environmental protection, and human rights. Working to open global markets and doing more to enhance global living standards will expand U.S., Mexican and global prosperity in the 21st century. Some have called the progressive approach to trade “protectionist.” That is an erroneous label. In fact, progressives are for expanded trade and for the United States meeting its leadership obligations in the international economic arena. However, we believe a broader approach is needed based on three pillars of economic policy: free and fair trade, enhanced development assistance, and debt relief for the poorest nations. Such a program could create more markets for U.S. exports, strengthen the middle class at home and abroad, and maximize our national security through a comprehensive program of engagement in all parts of the world. We need to forge a progressive approach to trade and development and create a new consensus on global economic engagement. At home in North America, we need to do more to promote trade and development with Mexico. NAFTA has been a real success in increasing trade between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, but it has done little to generate real development in Mexico. Despite the increases in trade, and enhanced Mexican productivity since 1993, a broad Mexican middle class has failed to emerge. Today Mexico is facing a serious recession and maquiladora jobs are leaving as companies move to nations, such as China, where wage rates are lower. Mexico is facing a race to the bottom and America needs to do more to combat this trend. We need to assist the government of President Vicente Fox with enhanced trade, aid and development. America has a great opportunity in the bilateral meetings at the Monterrey summit in March 2002 to work with Mexico on a progressive development plan. As a first step the resources of the North American Development Bank must be freed up to provide hundreds of millions of dollars of new environmental infrastructure along the border. Housing, health, and transportation infrastructure must also be improved at the border.

#### Streamlining border crossing is economic engagement

O’Neil 13  
(Shannon K. O'Neil, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Mexico Makes It: A Transformed Society, Economy, and Government,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138818/shannon-k-oneil/mexico-makes-it)

For most of the past century, U.S.-Mexican relations were conducted at arm's length. That began to change, however, in the 1980s and, even more, after the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) spurred greater bilateral economic engagement and cooperation. Mexico's democratic transition has further eased the wariness of some skeptics in Washington. Still, the U.S.-Mexican relationship is far from perfect. New bilateral policies are required, especially to facilitate the movement of people and goods across the U.S.-Mexican border. More important, the United States needs to start seeing Mexico as a partner instead of a problem.

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### A2: Motive is Non-Economic

#### Motive is irrelevant --- the form of engagement is key

Singh 1 – Swaran Singh, Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, “China-India: Expanding Economic Engagement”, 1-3, http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan-3-01html.html

A fourth route, in the eastern sector has been agreed-in-principle since the last few years but there remain some basic complications. The problem with this border trade post involves the ticklish issue of India's province of Sikkim that the Chinese continue to regard as an independent state. While the Indian side has been suggesting the route originating in Sikkim, the Chinese have been deliberating on this issue as it implies a formal recognition of Sikkim's accession to India. China, therefore, has suggested an alternate route from Kalimpong in the Darjeeling district of India's province of West Bengal (passing through Sikkim) to Yatung in Chumbi Valley region. The Chinese have also been indicating that such an agreement on this border trade post may include language implying China's official recognition of Sikkim as part of the Indian Union. New Delhi, however, would like China to recognise Sikkim as part of India as a pre-requisite to any such agreement. This is often explained in terms of India's earlier experiences with such trade pacts. For example, in another trade agreement of April 1954, Prime Minister Nehru had traded off entire Tibet for nothing. To break from this intractable deadlock in their eastern sector, the two sides have since expanded their framework and have been exploring possibilities of opening their border trade as part of sub-regional cooperation amongst India's northeast, China's southwest, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The first formal conference for this purpose was convened in August 1999 at Kunming in China's province of Yunnan and it passed a resolution which is known now as the Kunming Initiative. India is preparing to host the second such conference for sub-regional cooperation amongst these four countries during the first week of December 2000 at Delhi. All this clearly shows how despite continuous improvement in their mutual trade and commerce, their economic decisions still continue to be guided by their non-economic motives.

#### Economic statecraft is broad and complicated --- rigid definitions should be rejected

Dobson 1 – Alan, Professor of International Relations at the University of Wales, US Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933-1991, p. 7-8

Thus economic statecraft emerges as a focus of concern for scholars within the broader field of foreign policy. In this study, activity falls within the scope of economic statecraft not only when economic instruments are used as means for conducting statecraft, but also when non-economic instruments are used against specific economic targets in wartime. In examining the different categories of economic instruments of statecraft, it is clear that sharp theoretical distinctions drawn between sanctions, strategic embargoes, cold economic warfare and economic warfare cannot be sustained when trying to explain practice. We come to understand things by experiencing change and rendering it into an explanatory form via an appropriate theoretical framework. Practice is too complicated to be captured by preconceived rigid definitions that make no allowance for change. In simple terms, trying to define sanctions in the abstract has severe limitations. However, using the term sanction in a particular context can make sense, even when it overlaps with other tactics or strategies of economic statecraft, and when it has both instrumental and expressive effects. Actors often have several motives and several objectives in mind when they impose trade controls. Both intent and effect might simultaneously involve restricting and weakening the military and economic strength of a target state, economically strengthening satellites of the main target state in order to create tensions and jealousies, enhancing a bargaining position, allowing trade with the specific aim of trying to seduce mass opinion in the opponent state, attempting to persuade it to change policy, making a moral statement, and sending complicated and different messages to the target, neutral states, allies and the sender’s own domestic constituency. In these kinds of situations a single action is a sanction, a strategic embargo, a message-sender, and an instance of cold economic warfare or economic warfare. In situations where trade is allowed or promoted and looks like normal trade from the outside, it is only by addressing intention that we can see that more is at stake than just profit and loss. If the intent is to change attitudes in the target state, then this distinguishes the trade from normal commercial transactions. However it is not just in cases where trade is allowed or promoted that we need to be sensitive to the expressive as well as the instrumental effects of trade controls. They all make statements. Sometimes they speak to a target state in a way that was not intended by the sender, but they always say something. Particularly in times of heightened tension short of war, and especially in the Cold War, the ability of economic instruments of statecraft to send messages was of great significance to American policy-makers. For much of the Cold War it was more important than the instrumental effects of trade controls.

### A2 – EE is not Commercial

#### Economic diplomacy can be commercial – the Louisiana purpose proves.

David Baldwin 1985 Senior Political Scientist, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Economic Statecraft “What is Economic Statecraft?” pp. 29-50

Economic exchange may be viewed from three perspectives-the seller's, the buyer's, or the independent observer's. The independent observer is likely to describe the relationship as one in which each participant in the exchange voluntarily surrenders something of value for something he values even more. Each benefits, and neither is likely to feel coerced . This relationship is at odds with popular conceptions (or misconceptions) of power relations as zero-sum games, as involving a victim and a victor, as relations between unequal actors, as exploitative, coercive, and unpleasant from the standpoint of the actor being influenced . Some power relations, of course, do take this form and should be differentiated from normal economic exchange relationships. It does not follow , however, that all power relations take this form ; nor does it follow that the basic intuitive notion of power elucidated by power theorists is necessarily incompatible with the common notion of economic exchange. Indeed, it can be shown that all exchange relationships can be described in terms of conventional power concepts without twisting the common-sense notions that underlie such conceptsY Direct monetary payment is one of the most common ways for some people to get other people to do things they would not otherwise do. Knorr contends that " purely economic exchange" involves neither politics nor power. 38 Thus, he states: Strictly commercial exchanges . . . do not, in our opinion , involve economic power, unless they are affected by monopolist market power. For example, no use of power takes place when two trading states negotiate an exchange of exports without any insertion of threats or blandishments designed to affect the behavior of the other side. Although the actors are governments, the transaction is equivalent to a commercial contract between private firm s. When the United States purchased the Louisiana territory from France in 1803 for $12 million , Florida from Spain in 1819 for $5 million , and the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917 for $25 million , it used wealth , but there was no application of economic power. 39 The advantages of denying that the Louisiana Purchase involved politics or power are not immediately obvious. If President Thomas Jefferson wanted to acquire this territory from France, he obviously had a number of policy options, including military force, from which to choose. Direct purchase was one of several means by which he could attempt to get France to do something it would not otherwise do, i.e., transfer title to this land to the United States . This way of describing the Louisiana Purchase is compatible with standard notions of power employed by social power theorists . In addition, it helps to clarify the policy alternatives available to President Jefferson. These two advantages suggest that regarding direct purchase as a form of economic statecraft is a potentially fruitful way to think about foreign policy. If one adopts the perspective of either the buyer or the seller, it is easy to view such transactions as influence attempts . The buyer is trying to induce the seller to sell, while the seller is trying to induce the buyer to buy. The consummation of the exchange occurs if, and only if, both influence attempts succeed. Two hundred years ago Benjamin Franklin maintained that purchase was preferable to war as a means of acquiring territory . Forty years ago Nicholas John Spykman published a widely read book entitled America's Strategy in World Politics containing a chapter on "Power Politics and War," which includes "purchase" as one of the "great variety of techniques designed to win friends and influence people.' '40 This viewpoint, however, has been neglected in subsequent scholarship in the area of international politics and foreign policy . Indeed, recent scholarship explicitly denies that purchase should be regarded as an influence technique. For the student of economic statecraft, this is a step in the wrong direction.

#### Commerce is functionally equivalent to “economics” and, if there is a difference, it’s a subset of economic engagement.

Zutshi 8 – B.K. Zutshi, Former Indian Ambassador to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Former Deputy Chairman of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, “Training Needs for Commercial and Economic Diplomacy: An Indian Case Study”, http://www.cuts-citee.org/pdf/rreport08-01.pdf

2.1 Defining Commercial and Economic Diplomacy Teaching of and research in commercial and economic diplomacy is a relatively new field in pedagogy and academics, with the result that even the definition of the subject matter is not settled. At the first place, the distinction between “commercial” and “economic” is not at all clear: the difference between the two varies among authors, experts and analysts of the subject. Geza Feketekuty defines commercial diplomacy as encompassing “all the activities related to analysing, developing, negotiating, and implementing trade agreements”1 and economic diplomacy as “diplomacy related to all economic issues”.2 In this light, commercial diplomacy can be said to be a subset of economic diplomacy. In common parlance, ‘commercial’ and ‘economic’ are interchangeably used for the same set of activities.

#### Commercial diplomacy is part of economic diplomacy

Rana 11 – Kishan S. Rana, Former Indian Ambassador, and Bipul Chatterjee, Deputy Executive Director of CUTS International, “Introduction: The Role of Embassies”, Economic Diplomacy: India’s Experience, p. 3-4

Economic diplomacy is a multi-hued activity, easy to describe in broad brushstrokes, but harder to pin down with precision. From the perspective of members of diplomatic and commercial or trade services, and those that are the ‘customers’ or users of these services, economic diplomacy is a plural set of practices, all aimed at advancing the home country’s external economic interests. Is it different from commercial diplomacy? Opinions differ; some of those that have worked in this métier tend to see commercial diplomacy as a subset of the wider compendium of economic diplomacy. For instance, typically, commercial diplomacy would not include the management of economic aid – either as a donor or as a recipient – but that would clearly fall within the rubric of economic diplomacy. The same may apply to managing relations with international economic organisations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, or the UN regional commissions such as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). A chart showing their characteristics and differentiation is set out in figure 1

### A2 Kahler and Kastner (Celik)

#### Kahler and Kastner concede their study shouldn’t be generalized – case studies are too limited in scope

Kahler and Kastner 6 (Miles and Scott, Graduate School of IR and Pacific Studies @ UC-San Diego + Dept. of Gov't and Politics @ U. of Maryland, "Strategic Uses of Interdependence," p. 2)

We begin by developing a theoretical framework through which to examine strategies of economic engagement. Drawing from the existing literature, our framework distinguishes between different forms of economic engagement, and outlines the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these different strategies. With this framework as a guide, we then examine the strategic use of economic interdependence—focusing in particular on economic engagement—in three East Asian States: South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. We use these case studies to draw conclusions about the underlying factors that facilitate the use of a strategy of economic engagement, that determine the particular type of engagement strategy used, and that help to predict the likelihood of success. Because our conclusions are primarily derived inductively from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims of generalizability. Nonetheless, it is our hope that the narratives we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them will help to spur further research into this interesting yet under-studied subject.

### A2 Celik

#### Celik votes aff - Economic engagement must promote interdependence and trade.

Celik 11 [Arda Can Çelik, graduate M.A in political science and international relations at Uppsala University Sweden, “Economic sanctions and engagement policies,” http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/ 175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies]

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows “’It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations’’.(p523-abstact).It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance(1977)in a way that ‘’the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction’’¶ Although, much of the literature focuses on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, economic engagement strategies have rapidly gained momentum and gathers more and more attention(Kahler&Kastner,2006). Kirshner(2002) states that handful of studies examine the Hirchmanesque effects of economic relations and engagement policies therefore engagement policies are newly emerging alternative strategies against the economic sanctions. This literature is a composition of liberal and realist approaches. Liberals underline that Effectiveness of engagement policies are valid and ascending. On the other hand, Realists criticise the potential of engagement policies and does not give credits to the arguments of engagement strategies.¶ Liberal Approach ¶ Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001). Ecenomic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)

#### **A2 Celik evidence – Kahler and Kastner include the aff (Which is what Celik is citing).**

Kahler & Kastner 2006 Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait Miles Kahler, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego and Scott L. Kastner Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland Journal of Peace Research , Vol. 43, No. 5 (Sep., 2006), pp. 523-541

While the determinants and effectiveness of economic sanctions have been the subject of a substantial and growing literature in international relations, much less attention has been given to economic engagement strategies, where a country deliberately expands economic ties with an adversary to change the target s behavior. This article develops a theoretical framework that distinguishes between three types of engagement strategies: conditional policies that directly link economic ties to changed behavior in the target state; unconditional policies where economic interdependence is meant to act as a constraint on the behavior of the target state; and unconditional policies where economic interdependence is meant to effect a transformation in the foreign policy goals of the target state. The article presents several hypotheses concerning the conditions facilitating or hindering the successful implementation of these different strategies, and then examines engagement policies adopted by three East Asian states: South Korea, Taiwan, and mainland China. The cases offer preliminary confirmation of at least three of the hypotheses: conditional strategies are less likely to succeed when the initiating state is a democracy; transformative strategies are more likely to succeed when the target state is a democracy; and trans formative strategies are more likely to succeed when a broad consensus exists in the initiating state.